Can AI Become Judge Hercules?

Wang, Lin (2023) Can AI Become Judge Hercules? Beijing Law Review, 14 (04). pp. 2041-2053. ISSN 2159-4627

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Abstract

The commonly held belief that artificial intelligence cannot engage in value comparison within the judicial process is rooted in Hart’s analysis of judicial discretion. This view is, however, contested by Dworkin’s “law’s integrity” theory. According to Dworkin’s legal theory, the adjudication process involves constructive interpretation, aiming for a single best answer, as integrity serves as the exclusive standard for resolving any disputes over values. Consequently, judges do not possess discretion in the sense described by Hart. This article goes on to delve into the specifics of integrity, formalizing it into a series of formulas, thereby enabling AI to comprehend and apply it.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: STM Repository > Social Sciences and Humanities
Depositing User: Managing Editor
Date Deposited: 13 Dec 2023 10:01
Last Modified: 13 Dec 2023 10:01
URI: http://classical.goforpromo.com/id/eprint/4932

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